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Abstract
Location Based Service is one of the promising services in the M-Commerce arena. Although Location Based
Service offers many conveniences and advantages, it also opens the potential for inferences to be drawn about
consumers based on the knowledge of consumers’ whereabouts. In this article, an analytical model is
presented, and the findings from the model are discussed. We hope the model and the findings can offer some
insights into the privacy issues in Location Based Services, and help both the sellers and consumers to enjoy
the benefits offered by the new services.

Introduction
Location Based Service (LBS), as shown in Figure 1, is one of the new services enabled by today’s mobile technology. Advances
in mobile technology have enabled us to locate an item, or even a person, by great accuracy. There are generally two ways to
collect the location information. In the first way, users will say they are in the vicinity of a certain location, such as a ZIP code
or a city. In the second way, the information can be sent automatically using several location-detection technologies that are
beginning to roll out. The technologies include Global Positioning System (GPS) phones, network solutions that use two cellular
towers to describe the interconnection of signals with a users, and another method that relies on the time delay of the last
transmission. By using the location information, a user can then receive weather, restaurant, travel and other information and
services specific to that location.
The diffusion of M-Commerce is a bit slow in the states,
but it is very popular in Japan. Japan has its own version of
the wireless Internet – I-Mode. By using the fancy cell
phones and other mobile devices designed for I-Mode, you
can play games with your friends, read news, manage bank
accounts, trade stocks and more. Europe is also much more
advanced than the U.S. in terms of M-Commerce. For
example, according to Doland (2002), cell phones can track
down the nearest pub in Britain. Scandinavian teenagers
can use them to find out where their friends are hanging
out. A French company is even testing a dating service that
will signal when available singles are around.

Location and Personal
information
Consumers

Location Based
Service Providers
Customized Services
and Information

Figure 1. Location Based Services

Research Questions
One of the questions raised by LBS is the concern about privacy. The portability of mobile devices and the ubiquity of their
applications coupled with their ability to pinpoint the location of individuals and reveal it to others could produce a system where
the everyday activities and movements of individual consumers are tracked and recorded. The potential is there for inferences
to be drawn about consumers based on knowledge of consumers’ whereabouts.
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Our suggestion to solving the touchy privacy problems is to decouple the location information and the personal information. By
decoupling the location and the personal information, we can be sure there is no way to infer information about a user from his
or her whereabouts, because we either do not know who the user is, or do not know where he or she is. However, at the same time,
this scheme also makes it impossible for the users to receive customized information based on his location and personal
information. Hence, in order to enjoy and benefits and convenience of M-Commerce, consumers may need the choice to reveal
a combination of his location and personal information as well. Hence, this dilemma naturally leads to our research questions,
(a) How will the consumers reveal their location and/or personal information?
(b) What will be the socially optimal level of information revealing?
(c) How would the sellers like the information -- as accurate as possible, or a range will do?
In this article, a model of search and informative advertising is presented to study the problem. In the model, the consumers are
looking for a certain product, and they give out personal and location information in exchange for customized advertisements
about the products. The sellers provide those customized advertisements based on the information revealed by the consumers.
Of course, M-Commerce is not limited to customized advertising, but M-Commerce. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 3 gives the literature review. Section 2 presents the model and the analysis. Conclusions and discussions are presented
in Section 4.

Literature Review
The literature on consumer search is extensive. Diamond (1971) shows that when the search costs are high, sellers have the
incentive to set the price at the monopolistic level. A main observation of Diamond’s model is that profits are discontinuous and
jump to the monopoly price with a positive search costs. Rothschild (1974) offers a different search model by assuming buyers
do not know a priori the price distribution. Instead, he uses a sequential search model in which buyers learn about the probability
distribution while they search. He finds that in many instances the qualitative properties of optimal-search strategies are the same
as in the simpler case when the distribution is assumed known. Salop and Stiglitz (1977) introduce heterogeneity into the search
model by assuming some buyers are informed while others are not. They suggest that buyer heterogeneity will also lead to price
dispersion in the market. Bakos (1997) models the role of buyer search costs in markets with differentiated product offerings. He
finds that high search costs will result in market failure.
There is also a well-developed literature on informative advertising. Butters (1977) is the first to study the role of firms as
suppliers of price information. In his model firms provide buyers with price information through purely informative advertising.
Butters (1977) shows that because firms must bear the cost of providing the price information, a monopolistically competitive
market has an equilibrium with firms advertising different prices with different intensities. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) adds
heterogeneity to Butters’ model by studying the role of promotional expenditures by sellers in a model of product differentiation
in which advertising conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products. Stegeman (1991) modified
Butters’ model to allow buyers to have different reservation prices. He finds that in equilibrium, every firm on the continuous price
distribution buys less advertising than is socially optimal.

The Model and the Analysis
Let us consider a market of a heterogeneous product with n buyers and m sellers. The market is represented by a unit circle, and
the buyers and sellers are all uniformly distributed on the circle. Buyers each want to buy one unit of the product. A buyer may
reveal his location information l and personal information x in exchange for customized advertisements from the sellers. The
maximum level of personal information to reveal is x . i.e., if x = x , the buyer has given out all his or her personal information.
When a buyer gets more than one advertisement, he or she will just randomly choose one of them. Buyers suffer a disutility from
reading advertisements. Let us denote this disutility by U ( s B ) = as B , where a is a constant and s B is the number of
advertisements a buyer gets. Buyers also suffer anther disutility from revealing their location and personal information. For the
ease of analysis, let us assume the disutility can be represented as V (l , p ) =

b
, where b and is a constant.
l+x−x
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On the supply side of the market, let us use A( s S ) to denote the cost of sending advertisement, where s S is the number of
advertisement a seller sends. Also for ease of analysis, let us assume A( s S ) = cs S , where c is a constant.
For a buyer who is located at distance d B along the unit circle and reveals his or her location information as l, he or she will
receive advertisements from sellers located in [ d B − l , d B + l ] whose products can satisfy his or her need. Let us use τ (x ) to
represent the fraction of sellers whose products can satisfy buyers who reveal their personal information as x or higher, and let
us also assume that

dτ ( x )
< 0 . For the moment, we are looking at a symmetric equilibrium in which all buyers reveal their
dx

location information as l and personal information as x. Then the number advertisements a buyer gets is

s B = 2 ml τ ( x )
From the buyer’s perspective, he or she will try to minimize his or her disutility as follows,

U ( s B ) + V (l , p ) = 2 aml τ ( x ) +

b
l+x−x

The first order condition equations are not tractable without further assumption on τ (x ) . For ease of analysis, we assume τ (x )
is uniform, which means

τ ( x) =

x−x
. Then, from the first order conditions, we get
x
1

l1* =

1 bx 3
( )
2 am

and
1

1 bx
x1* = x − ( ) 3
2 am
If a seller’s product can satisfy buyers who reveal their personal information as x or higher, then the number of advertisements
the seller sends is

s S = 2 nl
Then from the social planner’s perspective, he or she will try to minimize the sellers’ advertising costs and the buyers’ disutilities
as follows,

mτ ( x ) A( s S ) + n[U ( s B ) + V (l , p )] = 2( a + c ) mnl τ ( x ) +
Also from the first order conditions, we get
1

1
bx
l 2* = [
]3
2 (a + c)m
and
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1

1
bx
x =x− [
]3
2 (a + c)m
*
2

Comparing the figures, we find that l1* > l 2* but x1* < x 2* . This implies that buyers are willing to reveal their location information
more than the socially optimal level, but will reveal less personal information than socially optimal. Also from the expressions
of l1* , l 2* , x1* , and x 2* , we can find l1* > l 2* > 0 and x1* < x 2* < x , which means the buyers will never reveal their exact location
information and full personal information in exchange for customized advertisements. Moreover, it is also never socially optimal
to require the buyers to reveal their exact location and full personal information.
As for the sellers, they will try their best to lower the costs for advertising, which means they will try to minimize 2 cml τ ( x ) .
Also from the first order conditions, it is very easy to find that

l3* = 0 and x3* = x
The above result is quite intuitive. It actually means that the sellers would like as much location and personal information as
possible. Hence, the sellers will support the revealing of consumers’ information, and they will be willing to pay for it.

Conclusions and Discussions
In the previous section, an analytical model is presented to illustrate the privacy problems in M-Commerce. Although MCommerce offers many conveniences and advantages, it also opens the potential for inferences to be drawn about consumers based
on the knowledge of consumers’ whereabouts. We argue that in order to protect the consumers, M-Commerce system should allow
the consumers to decouple their location information from their personal information, which means the consumers should be
allowed to only reveal their location information but keep their personal information private, or vice versa. In this way, no one
can infer information about a consumer from his or her location.
Interestingly, our analysis shows that even when consumers are given the right to decouple their location and personal information,
they may reveal a combination of his or her location and personal information in exchange for customized information and
services. However, the consumers will never reveal their exact location or full personal information. Moreover, we also find that
consumers may reveal their location information more than the socially optimal level, but they will reveal less personal
information than socially optimal. The above findings suggest that consumers are willing to give out some private information
for the conveniences offered by M-Commerce, but service providers cannot expect consumers to sacrifice all their privacies.
Instead, the service providers should leave some room for consumer privacy, and provide services that do not require exact
location and (or) personal information.
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